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Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is one of the most important aspects of quantum cryptography. Using
laws of quantum mechanics as the basis for security, the key distribution process is made information
theoretically secure in QKD. With the advancement and commercialization of QKD, an end-to-end QKD
simulation software is required that can include experimental imperfections. Software of this kind will ensure
that resources are invested only after prior performance analysis, and is faithful to experimental capacities
and limitations. In this work, we introduce our QKD simulation toolkit qkdSim, which is ultimately aimed
at being developed into such a software package that can precisely model and analyse any generic QKD
protocol. We present the design, implementation and testing of a prototype of qkdSim that can accurately
simulate our own experimental demonstration of the B92 protocol. The simulation results match well with
experiment; a representative key rate and QBER from experiment is 51± 0.5 Kbits/sec and 4.79%± 0.01%
respectively, wherein the simulation yields 52.83± 0.36 Kbits/sec and 4.79%± 0.01% respectively.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a promising techno-
logy that allows two distant parties, popularly referred to
as Alice (sender) and Bob (receiver), to share a sequence of
secret bits called the ‘key’ [1]. Unlike the state-of-the-art clas-
sical public-key cryptosystems, developed on Rivest-Shamir-
Adleman (RSA) algorithm [2], which depend on computa-
tional security i.e. hardness of factoring, the security of QKD
systems rely on the laws of quantum physics where eaves-
dropping introduces detectable errors [1, 3]. The secret key
generated from a QKD protocol implementation can provide
information theoretically secure communication when the
message is encrypted with the one-time pad symmetric key
algorithm [4, 5].
With QKD being commercialized [6, 7], sophisticated en-
gineering techniques are being developed [8, 9]. To include
and evaluate these growing techniques in the realization of
QKD protocols, there exists a requirement of finding a cost-
efficient approach. An useful alternative to the development
followed by testing of an actual experimental implementa-
tion is to design a QKD simulation toolkit, that can accurately
model the experimentation of the existing QKD protocols
and deliver the required analysis.
In this article, we present the design, implementation
and testing of a prototype of a QKD simulation toolkit (qk-
dSim) which we have developed, that can simulate an ex-
perimental demonstration of the B92 protocol, while taking
into account experimental imperfections. The prototype has
been designed with the vision that in future it will be ulti-
mately developed into a complete software package that can
precisely model and analyze any generic QKD protocol.
Earlier theoretical research has been performed on ana-
lysis of QKD protocols [10, 11] , and to model real-world
QKD systems [12]. Early stage research activities were lim-
ited to idealistic design of QKD protocols [13–15] and they
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also considered only a few optical components [16–20].
Web-based tool-kits that simulate QKD basics primarily for
educational purposes have also been developed [21–23].
The other development in QKD-related modelling is in the
simulation of QKD networks [24, 25]. The emphasis in these
QKD network simulations is on the network structure and
the dissemination of the secure key through various levels of
the network and not so much on the accurate simulation of
the QKD protocol towards the generation of the key [24–27].
Among the existing QKD modelling frameworks, a proper
modular structure and detailed modelling architecture for
the design, implementation and analysis of a full system-
level model can only be found in ‘qkdX’ [12]. Although, qkdX
has been deployed as a complete software package with a
modular architecture, limited attention has been invested in
it towards modelling the actual physical processes including
photon sources, from first principles, as well as detection
module. Additionally, qkdX leaves behind a large room for
improvement from the implementational viewpoint in the
level of imperfections considered while modelling some of
its optical components.
With this perspective, we have developed qkdSim that
supports quick, easy and precise simulation of physical pro-
cesses and evaluation of QKD systems, while considering
realistic experimental imperfections at a greater detail. For
instance, while in nearly all of the earlier works, the model-
ling of the input photon in the QKD protocol was considered
as a sequence of events, the corresponding input of our sim-
ulation is a sequence of time stamping data that follows
an ideal single photon distribution (sub-poissonian, anti-
bunching, g2(τ = 0) = 0). We have also modelled the
background noise as a thermal source, in order to perform
more realistic error analysis. In addition to that, our de-
tection module includes all imperfections like dead time,
quantum efficiency, timing resolution as well as afterpulsing.
Thus, qkdSim aims to simulate the key generation rate as
well as the quantum-bit-error-rate (QBER) for a wide range
of QKD protocols while taking into account an exhaustive
list of experimental imperfections. This will help in filling
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2the gap between abstract simulations of QKD and the actual
experimental performance. With a more accurate prediction
of experimental performance, resources may be more con-
fidently allocated towards real-world QKD implementations.
Our manuscript is organized as follows. In Section II, we
discuss some elements related to the historical developments
in QKD and thereafter we introduce the general stages as
well as the evaluation methodology of a QKD protocol. In
Section III, we discuss the software process models that have
been used to develop our QKD simulator. In Section IV, we
present a detailed description of our free-space based ex-
perimental demonstration of the B92 protocol. In Section V,
we discuss the various modules that have been construc-
ted for the simulation of the B92 protocol implementation.
In Section VI, we analyse the modelling of the associated
physical processes including single photon generation and
time-stamping of the photon arrivals. In Section VII, we
highlight the modelling of different optical and electrical
components that were used in the experimentation. In Sec-
tion VIII, we analyze and evaluate the results simulated with
qkdSim against those obtained from the actual experimental
implementation using the same setup. Lastly, in Section IX,
we provide the concluding remarks and discuss the future
research efforts that can be made in this direction. The
detailed analytical expressions and methodologies used at
various stages in the toolkit, have been provided as appen-
dices.
II. BACKGROUND, GENERAL APPROACH & PERFORMANCE
ANALYSIS OF QKD SYSTEMS
In this section, we first provide a brief summary of the
historical advancements in QKD. Thereafter in the second
part, we outline the main steps required to distill a secure
key in any QKD protocol. Finally in the third part, we define
the criteria to evaluate its security.
The first QKD protocol (BB84) was proposed in 1984 by
Bennett and Brassard [28] and then experimentally demon-
strated in 1989 over a 30 cm free-space optical channel [29].
The information theoretic security of the BB84 protocol has
been proven [1, 3, 30, 31]. Unlike the use of four non-
orthogonal states in BB84, QKD was achieved in 1992 using
two non-orthogonal states [32]. This was called the B92 pro-
tocol and it was experimentally realized with weak coherent
pulses (WCPs) in 1998 [33, 34]. Over the years, few proto-
cols such as E91 [35] and BBM92 [36], that perform QKD us-
ing quantum entanglement instead of the non-commutativity
of quantum operators as their resource, have also been pro-
posed and demonstrated [37, 38]. In 1998, QKD was first
shown to be secure with imperfect devices, more specific-
ally by the proposal of a self-checking photon source [39].
This work initiated developments in the topic of device-
independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD) which not
only proved that QKD can be fully secure with minimal fun-
damental assumptions and untrusted devices [40–43], but
also experimentally realized it [44].
An important model in a QKD demonstration is the type of
channel over which the key distribution is performed. Two
common choices are the free-space and fibre-based ones.
The fibre-based QKD setup in 1998 was able to commu-
nicate up to 100 km [34] following the first experimental
implementation of QKD in 1992 [29] and in 2003 using a
free-space optical link, QKD could be demonstrated only
up to 23.3 km [45]. Since then, substantial progress in re-
search has led to the rapid development of optical quantum
technologies and over the last few years, many experiments
including the demonstration of the feasibility of ground-to-
satellite, satellite-to-ground and satellite-to-satellite QKD
[46–55] have been reported as well as commercial QKD
devices [56–59] are available. Besides the implementation
of long haul QKD [60], chip-based integrated QKD systems
supporting miniaturization have been designed to enable
large-scale deployment of QKD into future telecommunica-
tion networks [61].
The process of generating a secure key in a QKD protocol
can be segregated into (i) authentication, (ii) transmission
using single photons or WCPs, (iii) sifting, (iv) error correc-
tion and (v) privacy amplification [50, 51]. More specifically,
in order to obtain the secure key, the randomly generated
raw key is first communicated over the quantum channel,
followed by information exchange over the classical channel,
that leads to the generation of the sifted key. Thereafter the
steps (iv) and (v) are implemented. Error correction recti-
fies the erroneously received information bits and estimates
the error rate, while finally privacy amplification extracts a
shorter and even more secure final key.
Performance of QKD systems are evaluated with the QBER
and the rate of secure communication [34]. A lower QBER
indicates higher security, while a high secure communication
rate implies that the transmission link has a good perform-
ance. Any information leakage to an eavesdropper about
the generated key leads to an increase in the QBER. There-
fore, obtaining a high QBER value reduces the rate of secure
communication during error correction stage of the QKD
protocol. If the QBER remains below a certain threshold,
then the two parties (sender and receiver) can still distill
a secure key string by means of error correction and pri-
vacy amplification [62]. In other words, if the QBER of the
sifted key is above the information theoretically computed
threshold for a given QKD protocol then the key is no longer
secure. In that case, any privacy amplification technique
becomes ineffective. Thus it is imperative for a QKD protocol
to ensure a proper upper bound for the QBER if the privacy
amplification techniques are to be employed to eliminate
any knowledge gained by the eavesdropper.
III. SOFTWARE PROCESS OF THE QKD SIMULATOR
In this section, we discuss the software development pro-
cedures on which our qkdSim has been designed. As a part
of this discussion, we also highlight the salient features of
those software processes and how they get associated to our
final objective.
A software process generally refers to the set of activit-
3ies that have been used to build a software product [63].
In software engineering, the simplified representation of a
software process is known as a software process model or
process paradigm [63, 64]. Although there can be different
processes and process models, each of them must satisfy four
activities that are fundamental to software engineering [63].
More specifically, these four activities are that (i) the soft-
ware specification must be well defined, (ii) the software
design and implementation must perfectly suit the require-
ments, (iii) the implemented software must be validated,
and finally (iv) the software must posses the provision to be
easily evolved as per user needs.
A. Overview of the process model
In this part, we explain the software process model that
has been used to construct qkdSim. Our QKD simulation
toolkit has been built using a hybrid process model [65].
From a top-down perspective, our version of the hybrid
architectural model consists of two parts: the ‘Waterfall’
development model which supports linear and sequential
design techniques; and the ‘Agile’ development model which
allows iterative and incremental design procedures [64]. In
this sense, it can be categorized as a kind of "Agifall" process
model [66]. Agifall merges the best of both worlds, by inject-
ing Agile techniques into loose Waterfall design procedures.
As discussed in Section II, any QKD protocol grossly is a
five-step sequential process, which experimentally involves
propagating the signal generated at the source stage through
the preparation, transmission, detection and lastly post-
processing stage. Therefore, in qkdSim, the outer struc-
ture, containing the gross five-step QKD design, has been
developed using the Waterfall process model, which pro-
motes a clear flow down logic scheme. However, keeping in
mind the continuous and rapid evolution of technological
advances, precision of handling imperfections and experi-
mental non-idealities; the inner software development ar-
chitecture for each of the five experimental stages from the
modelling of components and physical processes to data
processing methods have been developed using the Agile
process model, which supports development at a sprinter’s
pace. In a nutshell, by using Agifall process model we have
ensured that the design pattern remains robust and mod-
ular at every step of software development to ease future
customization challenges.
The key components from the Agifall process model,
which support the ‘best of both worlds’ logic, have been
highlighted as follows [64]. These components have been
primarily considered for the design of the inner and outer
structure of qkdSim.
• Modelling, usability and organization can be coher-
ently applied on the outer structure of all QKD pro-
tocols in general, so the choice of Waterfall process
model is suitable.
• Incremental updates in small update cycles allow rapid
improvement of basic experimental techniques and
components, so the choice of Agile process model is
appropriate for designing the inner parts of the imple-
mentation stage.
B. Salient features of the process model
In this part, we first present the salient stages of our ver-
sion of the Agifall process model in Figure 1 [64].
Figure 1: A schematic of the hybrid process model used to
build qkdSim. The outline of the simulator has been
developed on the Waterfall model, while its
implementation-based intricacies have been modelled using
the Agile design procedures.
Thereafter, in the following subsections, we discuss in details
the five major steps of the top Waterfall structure; includ-
ing the requirement analysis performed for developing the
toolkit, followed by the specifications of the system, the
design process and finally the implementation and testing
stage.
1. Requirement analysis
The first stage of our architectural model is ‘requirement
analysis’ where the goals and constraints of the software are
discussed by consultation with the users. These user require-
ments then serve as a part of the software specifications. The
probable users for the toolkit are identified as experimental
physicists and engineers working in the domain of quantum
communication and cryptography. The users are required
to provide necessary inputs for the toolkit to perform. The
requirements of the user that the toolkit will be able to fulfil
are analysed with the help of an user story. The principle
user story for the toolkit is
I, as a QKD experimentalist, want to simulate an
experimental implementation of a QKD protocol
and estimate the key rate, QBER and assess the
security of the implementation.
4The toolkit is also required to provide flexibility to the users
to simulate any experimental setup and be able to vary the
choice of various components in the setup. The toolkit is
built keeping in mind that the user requirements may vary
with time and hence the toolkit should be extendable to
accommodate modification of the various modules that form
the system. An important aspect of developing the toolkit
is the consideration of the security of the protocol being
simulated. The simulated results corresponds to a secure
implementation of the protocol where the security paramet-
ers are clearly stated. Following the stage of requirement
analysis, we move on to the stage where we identify the
specific inputs and outputs of the simulation toolkit such
that the user requirements are satisfied.
2. System specifications
The second stage called ‘system specifications’ is used to
identify the inputs and outputs from the user requirements.
Figure 2 represents the inputs and outputs of the simulation
toolkit. At this stage, we have formed the overview of the
system and identified the functions that the system is en-
abled to perform without delving into the question: ‘how’.
The inputs take into account the integral components of im-
plementation of a QKD protocol and various choices that the
experimentalists posses. The identification of the general
Figure 2: System specifications of the simulation toolkit
inputs and outputs to the toolkit leads us to the design stage
where we develop the architecture of the toolkit.
3. System design
At the third or the ‘system design’ stage, the user require-
ments along with the list of inputs and outputs have to be
associated with the hardware and software units to establish
an overall system architecture of the toolkit. The independ-
ent layers that will form our desired system must contain the
level of abstraction and flexibility that we want to provide
to the user. An optimal architecture enables us to develop
the system in an iterative approach and enhance the system
by considering further real-world imperfections.
In our design presented in Figure 3, the independence
of each layer of the architecture exists with respect to their
Figure 3: Architecture of the simulation toolkit.
development and modelling. However, there is a hierarchical
dependence among the layers in forming the components
of the experimental implementation to be simulated. Each
layer of the architecture can be explained as follows.
• The QKD protocol chosen by a user forms the top layer
of the system. The choices regarding the other inputs
to the toolkit will be dependent on the choice of the
protocol. As an example, for an entanglement based
QKD protocol, the choice of source is restricted to
entangled photon sources. Thus, depending on the
choice of the protocol, the respective modules from
the second layer will be chosen.
• The second layer is formed by the different modules
that will be used to simulate the corresponding as-
pect of the experiment. The modules can be further
sub-divided into different types to accommodate for
the various possible requirements. For example, the
source module can accommodate different types of
sources such heralded single photon, weak coherent
pulse source, entangled photon source, etc. Thus, the
user will be able to choose the specific type corres-
ponding to each of the modules as required for the
simulation.
• The bottom layer is formed by the sub-modules that
are modelled and are used to form the structures of
the modules at the upper layer. Each of the modules
will be functional by flow of logic through these sub-
modules. The sub-modules contain various modelled
components and processes that can be chosen by the
user as required for the modules.
The different layers developed in the architecture form the
basis for the next stage, which is the implementation, in
an iterative manner following the Agile model mentioned
previously.
4. Implementation
In this work, an experimental demonstration of the B92
protocol has been simulated by using the architecture de-
5scribed in the previous subsection. This is a prototype of the
toolkit, and the modelled physical components and processes
are limited to the current aim of simulating the specific im-
plementation. The accuracy of the prototype is limited by
the various assumptions that have been considered as well
as the set of imperfections that have been taken into account
for modelling the physical components.
beam splitter Polarizing beam
splitter
Phase retarder
Single mode fibre Single photon
detector
Time Correlated
single photon
counting module
(TCSPCM)
ppKTP crystal SMA Cable Bandpass filter
In-lab free-space
channel
Lens Coupler
Table I: List of modelled physical components
Type-II SPDC
process
Focussing and
collimation of
Gaussian beams
Fibre coupling
Single photon
detection
Time stamping Background
photon detection
Table II: List of modelled physical processes
Tables I and II categorize the different physical compon-
ents and processes that have been modelled and tested by
considering realistic imperfections. The design methodology
employed for the modelling of these two categories of ele-
ments is the Agile development procedure. Such a choice
allows the required flexibility for quickly incorporating the
future technological advancements, inclusion of further non-
idealness and improving the considered precision levels.
The simulation toolkit currently has been implemented
in Python and interacts via a command user interface. Now,
we move on to the analysis and testing of the implemented
prototype of the simulation toolkit.
5. Testing
At this stage, we test the various modules and sub-
modules, that have been constructed as a part of the proto-
type, simulates the experimental demonstration of the B92
protocol. Each sub-module was tested to verify whether
expected outcomes were obtained. The results from sub-
modules corresponding to the physical components were
compared with the data sets and characterization sheets
of the respective components. The sub-modules of the
physical processes are tested by matching the results with
experimental observations corresponding to the same pro-
cesses.The outputs from each of the modules were compared
with the corresponding sections of the actual experimental
setup. The overall verification and testing of the prototype
has been done by comparing the simulated outputs with the
experimental results obtained from the free-space demon-
stration of the protocol. In the upcoming section, that is
Section IV we provide a detailed discussion on the proced-
ure of our experimental implementation, while the results
obtained from the same are presented in Section VIII.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL DEMONSTRATION OF B92 PROTOCOL
IN FREE-SPACE
In this section, we describe in details our free-space based
experimental realization of the B92 protocol. In the first
part, we provide a brief overview of the B92 protocol and a
quick history of its various experimental implementations.
In the second part, we discuss in details the experimental
setup which we used to implement the B92 protocol. Lastly,
we highlight the general procedure and the associated novel
techniques, that we have developed and used to analyse our
experimental data i.e. estimate the key rate, QBER and key
symmetry for our experimental demonstration.
A. General procedure of B92
In a standard B92 protocol using polarization encoding,
Alice sends Bob a stream of single photons, where the po-
larization state of each of the photons is randomly selected
between any two non-orthogonal polarization bases, say, |a〉
and |b〉, where 〈a|b〉 6= 0. These two polarization states
are encoded with binary 0 and 1, respectively. When these
photons reach Bob, he randomly and independently selects
between two projection operators (I−|a〉 〈a|) or (I−|b〉 〈b|)
for each photon, and projects on it. Note that the operator
(I − |a〉 〈a|) always gives a null result when it operates on
|a〉. Similarly, (I − |b〉 〈b|) always gives a null result for |b〉.
A schematic of the B92 protocol based on polarization en-
coding is presented in Figure 4. Here, Alice randomly selects
the polarization state for each photon coming from a single
photon source to be either vertical (V) or diagonal (+) and
sends it to Bob. She also assigns bit values to all photons
based on their polarization and records them sequentially
(T1-1, T2-1, T3-0, etc.). Bob randomly selects his measure-
ment basis to be horizontal (H) or anti-diagonal (-). Bob only
considers those events where his measurements give posit-
ive (or non-null) results (T2, T5, T6, etc.) and announces
only the occurrence (or timing) of these positive events in a
public communication channel (that may be prone to eaves-
dropping), once all the photons have been received. Bob
never shares the choice of measurement operations for these
positive events. Based on the announcement, Alice only
keeps those bits that generate positive events in Bob’s setup.
Thus Alice and Bob generate and share an identical, secure
6Figure 4: Schematic of the B92 protocol based on polarization encoding.
key.
There have been many experimental implementations of
the B92 protocol. All these experiments can be broadly cat-
egorized based on three classification parameters i.e. types
of encoding, transmission medium, and type of source of
photons. Though the original B92 protocol was based on
phase encoding and many later experiments [67, 68] fol-
lowed similar logic, a number of experiments have also been
performed based on polarization encoding [69–72]. In terms
of the transmission medium, there are experiments in free-
space transmission channel [73–75] as well as fibre-based
channel [71, 76, 77]. In terms of type of source, interestingly,
most of the experiments till date use weak coherent pulses
(WCP) as single photons [68, 77–79], and only a handful of
experiments have considered heralded single photons gener-
ated from spontaneous parametric down-conversion (SPDC)
[72, 75].
In our implementation, we have used heralded single
photons generated using the SPDC process. Our choice of
source is connected to the security aspects of the protocol
and enhances the same. This is explained in detail in the
paragraph on post-processing below. The photons have been
encoded in polarization degree of freedom, and transmitted
in a free-space channel inside a lab environment.
B. Our experimental implementation of the B92 protocol
In this part, we will provide a detailed description of the
key resources and the various stages of our experimental
implementation. In the process of analyzing the different
stages of our setup and its associated components, we also
identify the different sources of noise and imperfection, that
can potentially affect our measurements, and highlight how
our resources help to mitigate them.
We use spontaneous parametric down conversion (SPDC)
as a source of heralded single photons. While there are a
very small number of SPDC based implementations of B92
protocol in literature, our implementation is significantly
different from the existing ones as discussed below.
The schematic in Figure 5 has details on the components in
the source. A blue diode laser of wavelength 405 nm (Cobolt
08-NLD) pumps a PPKTP crystal continuously with 30 mW
power. The polarization of the pump beam is kept horizontal
(H), by using a half-waveplate (HWP1). The PPKTP crystal
is placed inside an oven (RAICOL), which is connected to a
temperature controller. We find that at 40o C, photon pair
generation is optimal for collinear, degenerate, type-II SPDC
process in the crystal, wherein a horizontally polarized pump
photon of wavelength 405 nm down-converts to a horizont-
ally polarized signal and a vertically polarized idler photon,
both with peak wavelength at 810 nm. In order to maximize
photon pair generation, two lenses of focal lengths 100 mm
(L1) and 50 mm (L2) respectively are used; L1 focuses the
pump beam at the centre of the crystal and L2 is used to
7collimate the beam. Due to the collinear configuration, both
photons in each pair traverse the same path as followed
by the residual pump beam. A long pass filter F1, placed
after the crystal, blocks most of the pump beam and allows
only the red photons to go through. A band-pass filter F2,
allows only photons with wavelength close to 810 nm to go
through. A polarizing beam splitter (PBS) separates the two
photons in each pair, where ‘H’ polarized photon goes to the
transmitted arm and ‘V’ polarized photon goes to the reflec-
ted arm of the PBS. A coupler, FC1, placed in the reflected
arm couples ‘V’ polarized photon to a single mode fibre that
is connected to a single photon avalanche detector (SPAD;
COUNT-T-100). So, detection of a ‘V’ polarized photon her-
alds the ‘H’ polarized photon of the same pair. This is how
heralded single photons are generated.
Alice-substation: The components after the PBS in Fig-
ure 5 constitute the Alice-substation of the QKD implement-
ation. Once each heralded single photon is generated, Alice
randomly selects between two non-orthogonal polarization
states, vertical (V) and diagonal (D;+45o w.r.t. horizontal),
by passing the photon through a 50:50 non-polarizing beam
splitter (BS1), whose transmitted arm has a HWP (HWP2)
that rotates the input H polarization to D, and reflected arm
has a HWP (HWP3) that rotates the input H polarization to
V. Quarter-waveplates (QWP2 and QWP3) are also placed
along with HWPs, in order to minimize ellipticity in the po-
larization. The use of such a 50:50 BS for random selection
gives us quantum randomness, that is necessary for the se-
curity aspects of the protocol. However, this comes with the
caveat that Alice herself does not have knowledge about the
polarization state of the photon that she send to Bob.
In order to resolve this, we come up with a novel solution
wherein Alice makes use of two known properties of SPDC,
namely, heralding process and the probabilistic nature of
pair generation, where photon pairs are generated randomly
in time. If Alice now randomly selects a subset from gener-
ated photon pairs and applies a fixed time delay to them, it
becomes impossible for an eavesdropper to determine if the
photon pair is from the selected subset or the rest, just by
looking at the arrival time. So, Alice uses two single mode
fibres of different lengths in the two output arms of the BS.
Photons that traverse the transmitted arm and become D
polarized later have a fixed time delay (∆t) as compared
to photons that traverse the reflected arm and become H
polarized. Alice also records the arrival time of each her-
alding photon detected in her detector using a time tagger
(HydraHarp 400) connected to the detector. This is crucial
in determining whether the corresponding pair photon is
delayed or not, before it is sent to Bob, and hence its po-
larization state. Thus, by introducing a time delay in the
path of one of the photons and knowing the arrival time
information of its partner photon (heralding arm), Alice is
able to determine the polarization state of the photon that
is sent to Bob.
In order to remove any distinguishability in the spatial
degree of freedom, outputs from both single mode fibres
recombine at another 50-50 BS, and only one output arm
of the BS is used to send both V and D polarized photons to
Bob.
Bob-substation: In Bob’s part of the experimental archi-
tecture as shown in Figure 6, a 50:50 beam splitter (BS)
is placed in the path of the incoming photons, where each
photon has 50% probability to go to the transmitted arm and
50% to go to the reflected arm. In the transmitted arm of the
BS, one polarizing beam splitter (PBS2) is placed and a fibre
coupler (FC2) collects any photon that transmits through the
PBS and sends it to a single photon detector (SPAD2). So, in
that arm only D polarized photons have 50% probability to
get detected while V polarized photons have 0% probability.
In the reflected arm of the BS, a similar combination of PBS
(PBS1) and fibre coupler (FC1) is placed with an additional
half-waveplate (HWP) just behind the PBS. This HWP con-
verts D photons to V photons and vice versa. So, only V
photons sent by Alice pass through the PBS and get detected
in this arm half the number of times, but no D polarized
photon is detected. So, to summarize, any detection in the
transmitted arm of the beam splitter definitely means that
the photon is D polarized (assigned bit value 0), and any
detection in the reflected arm definitely means the photon is
V polarized (assigned bit value 1). Similar to Alice, Bob also
records photon time-stamping data from the two detectors
at his end.
Post-processing: In the post processing stage, Bob shares
only his time-stamping data publicly, but does not indicate
which time-stamping data comes from which detector. Alice
compares her time-stamping data with Bob’s data and meas-
ures time-difference for all detected photon pairs. Let us
say the distance between Alice and Bob is d, then the time-
difference should be ideally T = d/c, where c is the speed of
light. For the D photons, where Alice applied additional time
delay ∆t, time-difference becomes T +∆t. Alice considers
those events where time-difference is closer to T (within a
small time window around T) as bit value 1 ( in this case, V
polarized photons were sent by Alice to Bob), and considers
those events where time-difference is closer to T +∆t as bit
value 0 (D polarized photons were sent in this case).
Alice then sends back Bob’s time stamping data, with the
modification that all those events that couldn’t make it to
Alice’s final key are omitted. Based on this, Bob generates
his final key. Thus, they both agree on the same generated
key.
This brings us to an important comment regarding the use
of heralded single photons for our implementation and its
ramifications. For the purpose of security of the generated
key, generation of ideal single photons ( with Fock state |1〉)
is essential. In case of a multi-photon source, an eavesdrop-
per may apply photon number splitting (PNS) attack. One
way to verify the single photon distribution is to look for
the anti-bunching property where the probability of gener-
ating two consecutive photons within the coherence time
is negligible. For this purpose, we can measure the normal-
ized second order coherence or g2 by performing a Hanbury,
Brown and Twiss (HBT) type experiment. For an ideal single
photon source g2(τ= 0) = 0, where τ is the time interval
between two consecutive photons.
In a real-world experiment, there are stray photons that
8Figure 5: Schematic of the heralded single photon source and Alice’s module. M1, M2: dielectric mirrors; HWP1:
half-waveplate for pump light; L1: focusing lens; L2: collimating lens; F1: long pass filter; F2: band pass filter; PBS:
polarizing beam splitter; FC1, FC2, FC3: fibre couplers; BS1, BS2: 50-50 non polarizing beam splitter; HWP2, HWP3:
half-waveplates; QWP1, QWP2: quarter waveplates; SPAD: single photon avalanche detector; TC: temperature controller.
Figure 6: Schematic of Bob’s module. BS: 50-50 non
polarizing beam splitter; HWP: half-waveplate; PBS1,
PBS2: polarizing beam splitters; FC1, FC2: fibre couplers;
SPAD1, SPAD2: single photon avalanche detector.
get detected in Bob’s detection module along with single
photons that are sent by Alice. There are also other sources
of noise like dark noise of the detector, electrical noise, etc.
A single photon detector (SPAD) cannot distinguish noise
from the actual signal. These noises increase the quantum
bit error rate (QBER) in the generated key. For noise can-
cellation, heralded single photon source plays an important
role. In a heralded photon source, correlated photons are
always generated as a pair. Detection of one photon in each
pairs ensures the presence of the other photon. Therefore,
Alice and Bob post-select only those events where Alice de-
tects one photon and Bob detects the other photon of the
same pair (i.e. coincident events) and consider them as part
of the signal.
C. Data analysis
In the data processing stage, we measure three important
parameters that are the quantifiers of the performance of
the QKD experimental setup. These parameters are key rate,
quantum-bit-error-rate (QBER) and asymmetry of the key.
For key rate, we measure average number of bits in the
sifted key (including error bits) generated per second. In
B92 protocol, sifting includes post-processing of the data set,
where Alice and Bob selects only those events where Bob’s
detectors show positive outcome and the detection occur
within some predefined time window. After the completion
of the protocol Alice and Bob both have a key that should
be identical in the absence of any channel noise and eaves-
dropping activity. We measure the number of error bits by
comparing each value of the bits for the same bit position
in the two keys. The number of error bits divided by the
total key length gives the value of the QBER. Asymmetry
quantifies the disparity between the number of 0 and 1 bits
in the final error-free key shared by Alice and Bob.
In order to measure key length, QBER, and asymmetry
from each data set, we have applied two types of optimiza-
tion methods, namely A & B, on every data set. In both the
methodologies, at the beginning Alice and Bob’s recorded
time stamping data are compared and plotted as a func-
tion of time difference between the two. The schematic in
Figure 7 shows two distinct coincidence peaks due to the
time delay of around 10 ns introduced in Alice’s setup. First
9peak (blue) represents those coincidence events where Alice
sent V photon and Bob measured correctly. Second peak
(red) represents those coincidence events where Alice sent
D (delayed) photon and Bob measured correctly. The exten-
sion of the red curve under the blue curve represents those
events when Alice sent V, but Bob measured it wrongly as
D; due to the noise introduced by optical components as
well as the transmission channel. Similarly, the extension of
the blue curve under the red peak represents those events
when Alice sent D, but Bob measured it wrongly as V. We fix
some time window around both peaks (Wl1 to Wr1, and Wl2
to Wr2) and measure the area under the curves. The sum
of the total area under the blue and the red curve for their
consecutive time windows gives the value of the key length.
The sum of the total area under the red curve from Wl1 to
Wr1, and the blue curve from Wl2 to Wr2 gives the number
of total error bits (that contribute to the QBER).
Nevertheless, ideally for secure key generation the prob-
ability for obtaining any key string of N key bits among the
2N set of possible key strings should be equal; i.e. any key
can be generated with the probability of 12N . If this ideal case
is to realized then all the optical components should behave
perfectly, i.e. symmetric beam splitter has exactly 50% prob-
ability of both transmission and reflection, both coincidence
peaks should be identical. However, in real experimental
scenario the two peaks may be different. In other words, we
generated a large number of key strings and found that all
of them have equal asymmetry of around 60:40 due to the
asymmetric beam-splitting, i.e. our device itself introduces
the bias. If the device would have been generating perfectly
random outputs, we would have obtained an distribution
peaked at 50:50 rather than a fixed asymmetry value.
In order to counter this issue, we have implemented two
different optimization strategies: ‘A’ and ‘B’ (refer to Ap-
pendix B for the detailed procedure of the two strategies).
In strategy A, we optimize each key string individually and
obtain a symmetry of nearly 50:50 among them. More spe-
cifically, the whole purpose of this optimization method is
to find the value of the two coincidence time windows or
the position of Wl1, Wr1,Wl2, and Wr2, such that the QBER
remains below the threshold value (4.8%) [62] and the key
is symmetric (the number of 0’s and 1’s in the key string
is equal). However, this approach is still insecure as the
asymmetry distribution now becomes fixed at 50:50 instead
of 60:40. Moreover, this step requires deletion of some bit
values, that lowers the final key length. Nevertheless, this
strategy drastically reduces eavesdropper’s ability to extract
additional information about the key.
In our second strategy, B, while maintaining the same
length of the two time-windows, we changed their positions
such that we obtain the maximum key length within the
QBER bound, for each key string separately. The key length
value was found to increase in this process, but the asym-
metry value remained fixed at 60:40. However, it is possible
in principle, to adapt a modified QBER analysis method such
that eavesdropper’s additional information gain due to any
biases can be monitored.
In order to report the average key rate, we run the pro-
tocol for 10 seconds and repeat the same for 20 iterations.
The final key rate is then averaged over the 20 key length
values. In order to ensure that we choose a run-time of the
protocol such that the standard deviation (SD) by mean (M)
i.e. SD/M of the reported average key rate is very small,
we collected data continuously for a longer time duration
(say, 100 seconds), applied the bootstrapping technique as
discussed in Appendix A, and obtained a SD/M plot (refer
Figure 26) as a function of the runtime for fixed number of
iterations. We found SD/M for 10 seconds run-time and 20
iterations to be 0.016%.
V. SIMULATION TOOLKIT
In this section, we will discuss the principle aspects and the
current stage of the implementation of the toolkit. Following
an overview, we go on to discuss the various assumptions
that have been considered while simulating the experimental
demonstration. In the later sub-sections, we provide a de-
tailed discussion on the various modules that comprises the
toolkit.
A. Overview
We have simulated the experimental demonstration of the
B92 protocol discussed in Section IV using the simulation
toolkit ’qkdSim’ discussed in Section III. Different modules
have been developed for the respective choices correspond-
ing to the source, detection and transmission components
used in the actual experiment. The Table III lists down the
various choices for the general inputs to the toolkit and the
Figure 8 shows the interconnection of the various modules
developed for the toolkit.
Choices Inputs
Type of protocol B92 QKD protocol
Type of source Type II collinear degen-
rate SPDC source
Type of transmission channel Free-space
Distance of transmission 2 metres
Type of detection fibre-based detectors
and TCSPCM
Protocol run-time 20 runs for 1 second
each
Security parameter QBER threshold
Environmental conditions In-lab (daytime and
nighttime)
Table III: Choice of inputs
The modules are interconnected for the flow of logic and
mimics the path of the photons in the actual experimental
setup. The output from the source module, based on type
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Figure 7: A simplified schematic of the output of two independent coincidence detection: Alice and Bob’s V basis
(coincidence peak 1 in blue) versus Alice and Bob’s + basis (coincidence peak 2 in red). The background noise zone
indicated below the flat portions of the blue and red curve represents the unwanted coincidence detections from stray light
sources and dark noise of the photodetector. The symbols Wl1(2) and Wr1(2) represents the left and right markers of the time
window around the maximal coincidence point for coincidence peak-1 (2). The total coincidences within the chosen window
around the central maximum from both curves contribute to the ‘key rate’ (or signal - marked in purple); while those within
the background noise zone contribute to the ‘QBER’ (or noise - marked in grey). Note that in reality the coincidence curves
are not typically smooth functions and contain a lot of kinks (local optimal points) around a central global maximum.
Figure 8: B92 simulation structure
-II collinear degenerate SPDC process, is passed to Alice’s
preparation module. The signal states are encoded for trans-
mission and relayed to the transmission module while the
heralding states are passed to Alice’s detection module. The
transmission module simulates the transmission of single
photons over the quantum channel between Alice and Bob
and the detection of the received signal states is simulated in
Bob’s detection module. The outputs from Alice’s and Bob’s
detection modules are fed into the classical post processing
module, which then gives as output the sifted key rate, QBER
and the key symmetry.
Each of the modules is constructed with the help of various
sub-modules corresponding to the various physical compon-
ents and processes that play important roles in the experi-
mental implementation of the protocol. The inputs to the
modules can be categorized as user inputs, set parameters
and outputs obtained from preceding modules. The user
inputs refers to certain choices made by the user whereas
the set parameters refers to the specification of the various
components that the setup consists of. Before we discuss in
detail the structure and working of each of the modules, we
discuss the various assumptions that have been considered
for the simulation, in the following sub-section.
B. Assumptions
Though the simulation toolkit takes into account various
non-ideal aspects of experimental implementation of a QKD
protocol, it is not exhaustive. Thus it is essential to provide a
detailed list of assumptions that have been considered while
implementing the architecture at each stage of the iteration.
The assumptions considered for the simulation of the B92
protocol are listed as follows.
1. The time stamps associated with each of the photon
pairs are evolved through the experimental setup com-
prising different optical components. However, in the
sections of the experimental setup where the photon
pairs travel identical path lengths or the possible paths
that can be traversed by a single photon have identical
length, the time taken to travel is not accounted. For
example, the detectors in Bob’s detection module are
assumed to have been positioned equidistant from the
BS (Figure6).
2. The pump laser output is assumed to be a symmetric
11
Gaussian beam. The generated photons are also con-
sidered to have similar beam properties properties as
that of the pump laser. Thus each photon is associated
with a Gaussian distribution for the intensity.
3. It is assumed that the alignment of the optical and
mechanical components in the experimental set up is
achieved up to maximum precision, limited only to
the error introduced by the least count of the screws
of the mounting components and stages.
4. In the simulation of the type-II collinear degenerate
SPDC process, the frequency linewidth of the pump
laser is assumed to be extremely narrow and hence, the
frequency distribution of the signal and idler photons
is not taken into account. Additionally it has also been
assumed that the pair generation takes place only at
the centre of the crystal and the crystal medium is
lossless.
5. In the experiment, it has been observed that the im-
portant parameters of the system such as the laser
power, temperature of the crystal etc. does not fluctu-
ates significantly over the period of time for the data
acquisition. Thus, in simulation, we have the assumed
the system to be time-invariant and all the parameters
have been assumed to be constant over the run-time
of the simulation.
6. Any effect in the phase or polarization of the photons
due to the transmission over free-space and optical
fibre channel is neglected.
7. No eavesdropping strategy or attack has been con-
sidered for the simulation. A security parameter that
corresponds to a threshold QBER derived based on the
protocol and independent to the simulation is taken
as input to the system.
We have discussed the various assumptions that have been
considered in the implementation of the simulation toolkit
and now we go on to discuss each of the modules shown
in Figure 8 in order of the path followed by the photons
in the actual experimental setup. The source module is
discussed first followed by the modules corresponding to
the preparation, transmission and detection of the signal
photons and concluding with the post-processing module.
For each of the modules, a brief introduction is followed by
a brief discussion on the inputs and outputs to the modules,
the module structure and the algorithmic overview. Each
modules are constructed using relevant sub-modules and to
avoid redundancy, the detailed discussions on the various
sub-modules are given in Section VI and VII.
C. Type-II SPDC source module
The type -II SPDC source module simulates the generation
of photon pairs in a type-II SPDC process and the temporal
distribution of the photon pair generation events at the crys-
tal. At present, the module simulates the specific case of
type-II collinear degenerate SPDC process by quasi phase
matching (QPM) using a ppKTP crystal. The inputs and the
structure of the module are in accordance with this specific
case and the sub-modules are also developed accordingly.
Figure 9 lists down the user inputs to the source module, the
set parameters and the outputs of the module. [S] denotes
set parameter.
With respect to the structure, the source module is con-
structed of sub-modules for simulating the various aspects
of the SPDC process and the layout is shown in Figure 10.
The optimal QPM condition sub-module takes as input
the pump wavelength and the poling period of the crystal
and calculates the phase matching temperature for the de-
generate condition. The mode overlap function sub-module
then calculates the pair generation probability per pump
photon for the given conditions of pump beam character-
istics, crystal dimensions and temperature for the phase
matching condition. The total pair generation rate is calcu-
lated by taking into account the pump beam intensity at the
crystal and the simulated pair generation rate obtained per
pump photon from the preceding sub-modules.
The time stamp generation sub-module takes as input the
pair generation rate and the total run-time of the protocol
and creates a list of time stamps of the event of generation of
photon pairs at the crystal in respect to a global clock. The
spot size of the signal and idler photons is calculated from
the pump beam spot size and the electric field distribution
sub-module generates a list of electric field amplitudes, at
different points along an axis perpendicular to the direction
of propagation of photons, that follows a Gaussian distribu-
tion. Separate lists of time stamps for the signal and idler
photons along with the list Gaussian distribution of their
electric field are returned to the main module of the toolkit.
D. Alice’s preparation module
Alice’s preparation module simulates the stage where
Alice prepares the states that are to be sent to Bob over the
quantum communication channel. The signal photons are
encoded for transmission to Bob whereas the idler photons
are transmitted to the detection component of Alice. Fig-
ure 11 lists down the user inputs to the source module, the
set parameters and the outputs of module. [S] denotes set
parameter and [O] denotes inputs that are given as output
by the previous module(s).
Alice’s preparation module is constructed of various sub-
modules of different physical components and processes to
process the time stamps and the electric field distribution
of the generated photon pairs from the type-II SPDC source
module. The structure of the module is shown in Figure 12.
The arrows refers to the flow of logic within the module and
the two separate outputs are generated corresponding to
the signal and the heralding arm of Alice.
The initial section of the module is common to both the
stream of photon pairs generated from the crystal (signal and
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Run-time of the protocol
Degeneracy and collinearity condition
Wavelength, intensity and spot size of the pump beam
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Choice of the non-linear crystal
Dimensions, poling period and effectivenon-linearity
Time-stamps list of the signal and
idler photons
Electric field distribution and spot
size of the signal and idler photons
of the crystal
Figure 9: Source module overview
Figure 10: Type-II SPDC source module layout
idler). The time stamps and electric field distribution arrays
are first evolved through the lens sub-module that provides
loss and change of phase to the incident photons. The res-
ultant electric field distribution of the photons at the signal
and the heralding end of the module are calculated using
the input electric field distribution array. The time stamps
arrays are further evolved with the other sub-modules. The
PBS sub-module generates the signal and heralding photons
time stamps arrays and while the former is passed to the
following sub-modules, the later is not.
The signal time stamps array is separated into two with
each of the arrays being further evolved through the HWP,
fibre coupler, fibre transmission and the fibre collimator sub-
modules in order. At the HWP module, the photons are
projected to specific polarization desired for transmission
and encoded with a bit-value (’0’ or ’1’) corresponding to the
polarization. Each element of the time stamps lists of the
photons is appended with the corresponding bit-value. The
resultant arrays from the two different streams are further
merged at the BS sub-module and the final array is generated
and stored as the signal time stamps array. The resultant
arrays are returned to the main module of the toolkit.
E. Transmission module
The transmission module simulates the transmission of
the photons sent by Alice to Bob that can be over a free-space
or fibre-based channel. Figure 13 lists down the user inputs
to the source module, the set parameters and the outputs
of module. [S] denotes set parameter and [O] denotes
inputs that are given as output by the previous module(s).
It is important to note that the choice of the channel that
forms a general input to the system is specifically used in
the transmission module and in accordance with the choice,
the respective sub-module corresponding to the free-space
or optical fibre-based transmission is used. The transmission
module incorporates the in-lab free-space transmission sub-
module to simulate the transmission of the single photons
from Alice to Bob that is in accordance with the experimental
setup been simulated.
The time stamps of the transmitted signal photons and
the electric field distribution are evolved with the in-lab
free-space transmission module as shown in Figure 14. The
losses in the channel incurred by the photons are accounted
and the time stamps of the photons received at Bob’s detec-
tion module are returned to the main module along with
polarization encoding and electric field distribution of the
received photons.
F. Bob’s Detection module
This module simulates the detection of the signal photons
transmitted by Alice over the quantum channel. Figure 15
lists down the user inputs to the source module, the set
parameters and the outputs of module. [S] denotes set para-
meter and [O] denotes inputs that are given as output by the
previous module(s). The choice of the detection components
i.e. the type of the single photon detector and the time cor-
related single photon counting module (TCSPCM) dictates
the use of respective sub-modules within this module. Bob’s
detection module is constructed of the detection components
chosen by the user as well as the requirements based on the
protocol. As per the experimental set up, the sub-modules for
fibre-based single photon detectors and TCSPCM have been
used. The structure of the module is depicted in Figure 16.
The arrow denotes the flow of logic among the different
sub-modules. The detection of photon in the rectilinear and
diagonal basis are simulated separately with the respective
inputs corresponding to the noise level. The time stamps of
the received photons along with the polarization encoding
are evolved through the BS sub-module which splits the
received time stamps into two separate arrays correspond-
ing to the random basis choice in that the photons will be
measured. For the rectilinear basis, the photons are evolved
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Figure 11: Alice’s preparation module overview
Figure 12: Alice’s preparation module layout
Time-stamps list of signal photons with
Wavelength and electric field distribution of
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Modelled optical properties of the channel [S]
Time-stamps list of the signal photons with
polarization encoding successfully transmitted
Electric field distribution of the signal photons
at the receiving end of the channel
polarization encoding [O]
the signal photons [O]
Figure 13: Transmission module overview
with the fibre coupler and fibre transmission sub-modules to
obtain the photons that are received at the detector. In paral-
lel, the electric field distribution of the received photons are
evolved according to the distance of the fibre-couplers and
the coupling efficiency is obtained using the fibre coupler
sub-module. Similar logic is followed for the diagonal basis
with an addition of the HWP sub-module that enables the
simulation of the basis projection. From the sub-modules re-
lated to the background detection, the time stamps list of the
background photons are obtained and merged with the time
stamps of the signal photons received at the detector. At this
point, the polarization information of the received photons
is deleted as the information is redundant once the photons
have been received at the detectors. The time stamps of the
photons are then evolved with the single photon detector
and TCSPCM sub-module to finally generate the time stamps
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Figure 14: Transmission module layout
list of the detected photons. A bit value corresponding to the
basis at which the photons are detected are appended to the
list of the detected time stamps for each of the photons. This
list is then returned to the main module of the simulation
toolkit.
G. Alice’s Detection Module
Alice’s detection module simulates the detection of the
heralding photons that are separated from the photon pairs
at Alice’s preparation module. Figure 17 lists down the user
inputs to the source module, the set parameters and the out-
puts of module. [S] denotes set parameter and [O] denotes
inputs that are given as output by the previous module(s).
Similar to Bob’s detection module, respective sub-modules
corresponding to the choice of the detection components
provided by the user are used in this module.
Alice’s detection module is structured based on the pro-
tocol and the implementation that is being simulated. Fibre-
based single photon detectors and TCSPCM sub-modules
have been used to construct the detection module. The
structure of the module is depicted in the Figure 18. The
time stamps and the electric field distribution of the herald-
ing photons at the fibre coupler position at the heralding
arm of Alice are evolved through the sub-modules in series.
The fibre coupler sub-module uses the field distribution to
simulate the coupling efficiency while the fibre transmission
sub-module generates the time stamps of the photons re-
ceived at the detector. Similar to Bob’s detection module, the
incident background rate is estimated and time stamps are
generated with the help of the respective sub-modules and
are merged with the time stamps of the heralded photons re-
ceived at the detector. The detection is then simulated with
the single photon detector and the TCSPCM sub-module and
the list of time stamps of the detected heralding photons is
generated and returned to the main program.
H. Classical post-processing module
The classical post-processing module simulates the post-
processing of the data after the execution of the protocol.
The Figure 19 lists down the inputs to the classical post pro-
cessing module and the outputs of the module. [O] denotes
inputs that are given as output by the previous module(s).
The module incorporates the optimization strategies that
have been developed for implementation of the B92 QKD
protocol based on single photon sources. Depending on the
user choice for the security parameter, the corresponding op-
timization algorithm sub-module is used. Figure 20 depicts
the structure of the module.
VI. MODELLING PHYSICAL PROCESSES
In the current implementation of the QKD simulation ar-
chitecture, various physical processes have been simulated as
listed in Table II. The physical processes include generation
of photon pairs in SPDC process, time stamping of gener-
ated photon pairs as well as background thermal photons,
propagation of photons and fibre coupling and collimation
of the same. In this section, the simulation techniques used
for these processes will be discussed in detail.
A. Spontaneous parametric down conversion (SPDC) based
source
Background
Spontaneous parametric down conversion (SPDC) refers
to a process of amplification of vacuum uncertainties (or
fluctuations) of the optical field in the low gain regime [80].
In a SPDC process, a photon from the pump (p) laser beam
incident on a nonlinear (type-II) crystal such as BBO, PPKTP
etc. can originate two other photons: signal (s) and idler
(i) [81]; as shown in schematic Figure 21.
Figure 21: A schematic of the SPDC process through a PP-
KTP crystal of poling period (Λ= 10µm). In SPDC, the
input pump (p) photon at 405 nm (in blue) undergoes
frequency down conversion and outputs two near-infrared
photons (signal (s) & idler (i), highlighted in red) at double
its wavelength (i.e. 810 nm). The green colored dot/arrows
represent orthogonal polarization directions.
Given that the index of refraction changes with frequency,
only certain triplets of frequencies will be phase-matched
such that law of conservation of momentum (refer Fig-
ure 22(a)) and energy (refer Figure 22(b)) are satisfied. In
order to achieve phase matching through the use of a bi-
refringent crystals, the highest frequency waveωp =ωs+ωi
is polarized in the direction that gives it a lower of the two
15
Electric field distribution of the signal photons
Choice of the detectors and TCSPCM
Modelled properties of the detectors and TCSPCM [S]
Position of the optical components and fibre couplers
Time-stamps list of the signal photons with polarization
encoding received at the module [O]
Time-stamps list of the detected
photons in the rectilinear basis
received at the module [O]
Modelled properties of the optical components and
fibre couplers [S]
Length of the optical fibres and SMA cables
Modelled optical properties of the optical fibres
and SMA cables [S]
Noise (background) level in the coincidence plots
Time-stamps list of the detected
photons in the diagonal basis
Figure 15: Bob’s detection module overview
Figure 16: Bob’s detection module layout
possible refractive indices [80]. For the type-II crystal, this
choice corresponds to the extraordinary polarization [80].
Also, the polarization of the pump photon should be the
same (extraordinary: e) as the signal, while the idler should
have orthogonal (ordinary: o) polarization (refer the green
encircles/arrows in Figure 21). Thus, for type II crystals,
ep = es + oi .
Figure 22: Schematic describing the relations for the law of
conservation of momentum (left) and energy (right); where
Λ= 10µm.
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Time-stamps list of the detected
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Time-stamps list of the detected
photons in the heralding arm [O]
Choice of the security parameter
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Sifted key rate, quantum bit error
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Figure 19: Classical post processing module overview
From the above considerations for the conservation of
energy and momentum in a SPDC process, the phase match-
ing condition for a periodically poled KTP crystal can be
obtained by solving the Sellmeier equations using the values
of the constants given in [82–84]. Numerically, the phase
matching temperature was calculated to be 44.4◦C consid-
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Figure 20: Classical post-processing module layout
ering a pump wavelength of 405 nm along with signal and
idler wavelengths of 810 nm (please refer Appendix D for
detailed expressions).
Pair generation probability & pair generation rate
The pair generation probability density is the square mod-
ulus of the probability amplitude of the SPDC process i.e.
|ψ (ωs, ωi)|2. Now since ωp =ωs +ωi and ωp is the co-
herent state of the laser source, if we numerically integrate
ψ (ωs, ωi) over a possible range of signal frequencies (ωs)
then we would obtain a sinc2 nature plot for this pair gener-
ation probability density plotted over a spectrum of signal
mode frequencies as illustrated through a schematic in Fig-
ure 23.
Figure 23: Schematic describing the sinc2 nature of pair
generation probability density corresponding to a spectrum
of mode frequencies.
The maximum of this probability distribution provides the
corresponding wavelength information at which SPDC pair
generation rate would be maximal. The maximum value
of pair generation probability obtained numerically can be
directly verified with the experimental data. Consequently,
the pair generation rate is given by,
RT =
∫
|ψ (ωs, ωi)|2 dωsdωi

× Np (1)
where Np =number of pump photons entering the crystal
per second.
B. Time stamping of single and background photons
In an idealistic picture, we consider a photon source
that generates perfect (only) single photon events
(Fock state |1〉). The quantum uncertainty of detect-
ing each output photon with frequency ω at time t is
∆t∆ω ≥ 12 . The probability distribution of measuring
a given photon at time t (or with frequency ω) then
becomes the modulus square of its wave function (or its
probability amplitude). The distribution also depends on
the source properties as well as the filtering conditions.
For example, in a SPDC source (as presented through a
schematic in Figure 24), the probability distribution can be
Gaussian or Sinc-squared, depending on the non-linearity
profile of the crystal as well as the spectral profile of the filter.
Figure 24: A probabilistic ideal single photon source emitting
a stream of photon pairs at times t1, t2, t3. Detection of the
idler photon heralds the signal photon of the same pair.
The detection time uncertainty for each photon has been
depicted with a Gaussian distribution.
Defining the probability of a photon generated at time
t1 + τ is Pr (t1 +τ|t1) given that the earlier photon was
generated at time t1; then for an ideal single photon
source, for τ = 0, this probability becomes zero i.e.
Pr (t1|t1) = 0. Now for all τ  tcoh, where tcoh is our
coherence time, this probability will have a constant value
p i.e. Pr (t1 +τ|t1) = p. This is because of the fact that for
very large values of τ beyond the coherence time tcoh, the
source behaves truly randomly and emits single photons
at any arbitrary interval with equal probability. Therefore
as shown in Figure 25(b), if we plot this probability as a
function of τ, it will smoothly increase from 0 and saturate
at p.
Let’s assume that 107 photons are generated per second.
So, we divide the time span of 1 second into equal bins of
1 ps time resolution and then we get 1012 bins in 1 second.
When 107 photons are randomly distributed into those 1012
bins, the probability of having a photon in each bin becomes
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Figure 25: (a) Schematics comparing the positions of
time-uncertainty distributions for two single photon events
with three different relative time intervals τ: (i) τ= 0
where Pr (t1 +τ|t1) = 0 (ii) 0< τ < tcoh where
0< Pr (t1 +τ|t1)< p (iii) τ tcoh where
Pr (t1 +τ|t1) = p. (b) A schematic of the nature of the
probability distribution Pr (t1 +τ|t1) as a function of τ for
any arbitrary t1.
10−5. However, we enforce a restriction that if one photon
has already been assigned to a bin, say x , then the probability
of another photon to be assigned to the same bin (x) is zero.
Now as illustrated earlier in Figure 25, this probability of
assignment for each bin slowly increases for the subsequent
bins i.e. x + 1, x + 2, x + 3, ... and saturates at p = 10−5 for
some bin number, say in this case x + n, where n is related
to the coherence time. Please refer to Appendix C for the
comparison between the simulated and the experimental
time stamping data.
While generating the time stamps list for each run of the
protocol, it has been observed that the process increases the
run-time of the simulation significantly. In order to speed
up the process, we adapted data re-sampling technique to
generate time stamps list. For an arbitrary simulated single
photon pair generation rate, time stamps list is generated
only for the first instance of the simulation. In further runs
of the simulation, where the parameters for the type-II SPDC
source module remain unchanged and hence similar pair rate
is obtained, the re-sampling technique is used to generate
the time stamps list. The application of the re-sampling
technique results in variation in the number of time stamps
generated for a fixed time-interval. The number of time
stamps generated determines the effective number of photon
pairs that forms the input to the subsequent modules in the
simulation toolkit. In Section V B, we mentioned that it has
been assumed that all the parameters remain invariant over
the run-time of the simulation. Thus, for multiple runs of
the simulation with fixed parameters, the simulated pair
generation rate remains constant over all such instances.
But the effective number of photon pairs generated varies
because of the usage of re-sampling technique.
C. Detection of background photons
Besides the single photons from a SPDC source, the ex-
perimental detections also consists of other background
photons that commonly originate from any surrounding
thermal source. From literature, the photon number (n)
distribution for such a source is commonly super-Poissonian
where Pr (n) = µ
n
(1+µ)n+1
. If we measure the second-order
coherence g(2) for such a source, then it exhibits bunch-
ing property, where g(2) at τ = 0 is greater than that at
τ  0. In our simplified model to simulate these back-
ground photon statistics we have considered multi-photon
events only up to two photons. Also, we have assumed that
Pr (n = 2) = Pr (n = 1)2, which implies that Pr(2)Pr(1)  1 since
0≤ Pr (n)≤ 1. Here, it is important to note that for an ideal
single photon distribution Pr(2)Pr(1) ≈ 0.
We assume that 105 photons are generated per second. As
earlier, we divide the time span of 1 second into equal bins,
each of 1 ps time resolution, and then we get 1012 bins in
1 second. Now, let us consider, the probability of assigning
a single photon event to an empty bin is P1, then the prob-
ability of assigning a multi-photon event to an empty bin
becomes P21 from the above idea. Therefore the probability
of assigning atleast one photon in each bin is P1 + 2× P21 .
Thus, from the above assumptions that 105 photons are gen-
erated per second, the value of P1 becomes ≈ 10−7. We
use the above considerations to generate the time stamping
data for our background contributions from various thermal
sources.
Initially, an interpolation data set is generated by varying
the incident background rate at the detectors and obtaining
the corresponding background coincidence rate for a fixed
signal rate. In our case, we have fixed the signal rate at 18
MHz which corresponds to the single photon pair generation
obtained from the source simulation for a PPKTP crystal of
length 20 mm. The interpolation data set is then pre-stored
and used to obtain the incident background rate for any
arbitrary input background coincidence rate.
The data set for interpolation of the incident background
rate from a given background coincidence rate is generated
for a specific signal rate of 18 MHz as mentioned. For an
arbitrary signal rate, we want to estimate the ratio in which
the interpolated background rate will be affected. For a
fixed incident background rate, this ratio can be calculated
by dividing the background coincidence rate at any arbitrary
input signal rate divided by the the background coincidence
rate at the 18 MHz signal rate. The final incident background
rate is obtained by performing interpolation on the pre-
stored interpolation data-set that has been generated, at a
fixed background incidence rate, by varying the signal rate
and obtaining the background noise level in the coincidence
plots for the diagonal and rectilinear basis measurements.
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D. Propagation of single photons
In the source module, each of the generated photons
are associated with a Gaussian distribution correspond-
ing to their electric field amplitude. The propagation of
single photons have thus been simulated by using the Huy-
gen’s principle for propagation of Gaussian beams in 2-
dimensions.
E. Fibre Coupling
In the experimental set up, coupling of single photons
into a single mode fibre is done using stages and couplers
that provide certain degrees of freedom to align the fibre-
tip with the input beam in order to maximise the coupling.
In our simulation toolkit, the fibre coupling sub-module
is used to simulate active coupling mechanism that a user
might perform while aligning the experimental set up. As
mentioned in Section V B, the position of the fibre tip is
simulated accurately for the maximum coupling up to the
least count of the coupling apparatus. The error in the
position of the fibre tip is simulated by randomly selecting a
value from a Gaussian distribution with the least count being
twice the sigma of the distribution. The sub-module takes in
as input the specifications of the physical components such as
the fibres and the aspheric lenses within the couplers and the
electric field distribution of the incident photons and returns
the effective coupling efficiency as the output. The efficiency
is calculated as the overlap between the intensity distribution
of the received photons at the fibre-tip and the Gaussian
distribution with the mode field radius of the fibre as the
standard deviation. By further considering the associated
losses, the effective coupling efficiency is obtained.
VII. MODELLING PHYSICAL COMPONENTS
In this section, we will discuss briefly the various physical
components that have been simulated as listed in Table I.
The physical components that forms the experimental setup
for demonstration of the B92 protocol includes optical com-
ponents such as lenses, filters and beam splitters, free-space
and optical fibre based channel, detectors and TCSPCM. The
simulation methodology for the sub-modules corresponding
to these physical components are discussed as follows.
A. Lens
The working of a lens is simulated by using the lens trans-
fer function calculated from the specifications of the respect-
ive lens and applying that on the electric field corresponding
to the incident photons. As specified in the list of assump-
tions, the photons are considered to have the distribution of
intensity as Gaussian, so the effect of the lens is simulated in
the case of Gaussian beams only. The lens sub-module takes
in as input the specifications corresponding to the type of
material, the radius of curvatures, etc. and the electric field
distribution of the incident photons, and returns the electric
field distribution of the photon after it passes through the
lens as output.
B. Half-wave plate (HWP)
The HWP sub-module simulates the the effect of phase
shift on the polarization of the photons transmitted through
the HWP. The orientation of the fast-axis of the HWP with
the respect to the polarization of the incoming photons is
simulated by the choice of basis for the required projection.
The accuracy of the orientation is limited by the least count
of the mounting component and the error is simulated by
randomly choosing a value from a Gaussian distribution with
the least count being twice the standard deviation of the
distribution. The parameters regarding the loss through the
medium, least of count of the mounting component etc. are
set within the sub-module.
C. Filter
The filter sub-module simulates the effect of filter on a
beam or photons of certain wavelength. For now we have
modelled a very simplified filter inspired from the real com-
ponents used in the experimental setup and thus can be
further enhanced to capture more practical scenarios. The
sub-module takes into account the insertion and the trans-
mission losses incurred by the photons incident on the filter.
D. Polarizing beam splitter (PBS)
The PBS sub-module simulates the transmission of a lin-
early polarised beam through a PBS. The extinction ratio and
the loss associated with the PBS is set within the sub-module
as set parameters by taking data from the specifications
sheet provided by the manufacturer. The sub-module takes
as input the time stamps of the incident photons and the po-
larization angle of the photons and returns the time stamps
of the photons exiting the transmission and the reflection
arm of the PBS in separate lists.
E. Beam splitter (BS)
The BS sub-module simulates the transmission of a beam
through a beam splitter(PBS). The loss associated with the
BS is set within the sub-module as set parameters by taking
data from the specifications sheet provided by the manufac-
turer. The sub-module takes as input the time stamps of the
incident photons and returns the time stamps of the photons
exiting the transmission and the reflection arm of the BS in
separate lists.
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F. Fibre transmission
The fibre-transmission sub-module simulates the trans-
mission of a string of photons through a fibre of a certain
length. The sub-module takes into account only the losses
encountered by the beam while transmission and does not
consider any other effect due to the fibre. This takes as input
the length of the fibre channel in metres and the time stamps
of the coupled photons into the fibre. The loss associated
with the transmission as well as the insertion loss at the mat-
ing sleeves are taken from the specification sheet of the fibre
and defined within the sub-module. The sub-module finally
returns the time stamps of the photons that have reached
the exit port of the channel.
G. In-lab free-space transmission
This sub-module simulates the transmission of a string
of photons through free-space of a certain length. It takes
into account only the losses encountered by the beam while
transmission and does not consider any other effect due to
the free-space channel. The sub-module takes in as input
the length of the free-space channel in metres and the time
stamps of the photons travelling through the channel and
returns the time stamps of the photons that have reached
the exit port of the channel.
H. Fibre-based single photon detectors
This sub-module simulates the detection process of single
photons with fibre-based detectors. In other words, we con-
sider the case where single photons are coupled to the de-
tector with a fibre and get detected via avalanche breakdown
process at the photo diode of the detector. For each detection
event, the detector outputs a TTL pulse corresponding to the
detected photon(s). The sub-modules provides a simplistic
approach towards modelling of single photon avalanche de-
tectors (SPADs) and hence, is restricted to only SPADs. This
takes the time stamps of the stream of photons incident at
the detector as an input. The primary detector imperfections
that we have considered for simulation are the quantum ef-
ficiency of the detector, dead time and timing jitter of the
detector, are explained as follows. The values corresponding
to these parameters are taken from the specification sheet
of the detector and set within the sub-module.
1. Quantum efficiency: A single photon detector has a
certain efficiency of detecting photons incident on it i.e.
for each of the photons received at the detector, a TTL
pulse is not generated. The probability of generation
of the TTL pulse on receiving an incident photon is
quantified using the parameter quantum efficiency of
the detector. The quantum efficiency of the detector
or the detector efficiency depends on the wavelength
of the incident photons.
2. Detector dead time: The dead time of a detector is the
time interval after a detection event, followed by an
avalanche breakdown, during which the detector is
unresponsive to any photon incident at the detector. It
defines the time required by the detector to restore the
quenching circuit. Thus the minimum time interval
possible between two detection events is the dead time
of the detector.
3. Timing jitter: Due to imperfections in the detector
circuit, there is a time uncertainty between receiving
a photon at the detector and generating the TTL pulse.
The time interval between generation of the TTL pulse
corresponding to a photon detection and the time at
which the photon is actually received at the detector
is not constant and has a Gaussian distribution. This
uncertainty is quantified by the timing jitter of the
detector, i.e. the full width at half maximum (FWHM)
of the distribution.
The logic used for simulating the single photon detection
event at the detectors considering the specified imperfec-
tions can be explained as follows. The quantum efficiency
affects the difference in the total number of photons incid-
ent at the detector and those actually detected. For each
photon incident at the detector, we generate a random num-
ber in the range [0,1] as in principal the efficiency of the
detector is ≤ 1. If the random variable has a value less
than the quantum efficiency of the detector, the instance is
considered as the detection event. The detector dead time is
then accounted by checking the difference in the time stamp
value of the consecutive photons received at the detector.
If the difference is less than the dead time, the photon cor-
responding to the larger time stamp value is discarded and
the time difference with the next photon is checked and the
process continues for all the received photons. To simulate
the timing jitter of the detector, each of the generated TTL
pulses corresponding to detected photons is adjusted with a
time delay chosen randomly from a Gaussian distribution
with a mean (µ) of zero and standard deviation (σ) value
equalling to 2.3 times the timing jitter of the detector.
I. Time Correlated Single Photon Counting Module
(TCSPCM)
A TCSPCM receives the TTL pulses generated at the de-
tector corresponding to the detection events and registers
time stamps for the TTL pulses. The TCSPCM sub-module
simulates this process by taking as input the time stamps of
the TTL pulses generated at the detector corresponding to
the detection events. The primary TCSPCM imperfections
that we have considered for simulation are the losses in the
SMA cables that connects it to the detectors, dead time and
timing jitter of the TCSPCM. In the following, we explain
the various parameters that have been accounted to model
the TCSPCM.
1. SMA cable losses: SMA cables are used to connect
detector to the TCSPCM. These cables have some in-
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herent losses at the connectors and as a result of that,
some of the TTL pulses generated from the detectors
are lost.
2. TCSPCM dead time: Similar to the detectors, the
dead time of a TCSPCM is the minimum time interval
between registering two TTL pulses received from the
detector. The value of the dead time is set within the
sub-module as per the specification sheet.
3. Timing jitter: Due to imperfections in the TCSPCM
circuit, the time stamps associated to a received pulse
is not the same as the time at which the TTL pulse
was received. The distribution of this time delay is
a Gaussian distribution, centred at the time at which
the pulse was actually received by the TCSPCM. This
deviation is quantified using the timing jitter of the
TCSPCM.
The dead time of the TCSPC module and the timing jitter
is simulated in the same way as that has been done for the
detector. For the SMA cable losses, the channel efficiency is
calculated using the relation: tcspcme = 10−
loss
10 .
VIII. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Our manuscript introduces a new simulation toolkit called
qkdSim. While in the future, we aim to develop this into
a software that will be able to simulate any QKD protocol
along with consideration of the associated experimental im-
perfections, in the present work, we show details of the B92
protocol simulation and the comparison of its performance
analysis with the results of our experimental demonstration
of B92 protocol using a heralded single photon source. We
find a reasonably good match between theory and experi-
ment as is discussed below.
Here we compare the final results obtained from the ex-
periment with those from simulations and then discuss their
implications. The comparative results from the experiment
and simulations, using the two optimization strategies A
and B, are presented in Tables IV and V respectively. The
results reported for the experiment have been obtained by
averaging the measured outcomes over 20 measurement
sets, wherein each set involved a measurement time of 10
seconds. For the simulation, while number of sets for aver-
aging remained the same, the runtime of the protocol was
considered to be 1 second. Here, the consideration of a
smaller runtime for the simulation can be motivated from
the assumption of time-invariance that has been considered
for this system. The error values quoted are the standard
deviations of the 20 iterations respectively.
Crystal
length
(mm)
Time
of
the
day
Optimization strategy A
From experiment From simulation
key
rate
(kHz)
QBER
(%)
asym-
metry
(%)
key
rate
(kHz)
QBER
(%)
asym-
metry
(%)
20
Day
47.6
±0.6
4.79
±0.01
49.82
±0.01
53.08
±0.31
4.79
±0.01
50.1
±0.06
Night
51.0
±0.5
4.79
±0.01
50.15
±0.02
52.83
±0.36
4.79
±0.01
50.1
±0.05
30
Day
33
±2
4.78
±0.01
50.07
±0.02
64.11
±0.98
4.78
±0.01
50.05
±0.08
Night
36
±3
4.78
±0.01
50.08
±0.02
59.56
±1.55
4.79
±0.01
50.01
±0.11
Table IV: Optimized results of average key rate, QBER and
asymmetry (i.e. key symmetry), obtained using strategy A,
from the experiment and the simulation.
Crystal
length
(mm)
Time
of
the
day
Optimization strategy B
From experiment From simulation
key
rate
(kHz)
QBER
(%)
asym-
metry
(%)
key
rate
(kHz)
QBER
(%)
asym-
metry
(%)
20
Day
47.8
±0.6
4.79
±0.01
50.2
±0.3
59.97
±0.25
4.79
±0.01
56.95
±0.2
Night
53.8
±0.4
4.79
±0.01
53.7
±0.3
59.81
±0.25
4.79
±0.01
56.97
±0.19
30
Day
36
±2
4.79
±0.01
54.0
±0.3
71.42
±0.95
4.79
±0.01
57.05
±0.32
Night
38
±3
4.78
±0.01
54.1
±0.4
65.86
±1.8
4.79
±0.01
57.11
±0.3
Table V: Optimized results of average key rate, QBER and
asymmetry (i.e. key symmetry), obtained using strategy B,
from the experiment and the simulation.
All the reported results have been obtained using the op-
timization strategies (introduced in Section IV C) and as a
consequence of that the results are dependent on the back-
ground noise in the coincidence plots. The source of this
noise comes from the background photons incident at the
detector. Firstly, we observe in Table IV that the error values
for both the estimated QBER and asymmetry parameters,
are at least one order of magnitude lower than those for the
key rates, irrespective of their origin: i.e. from experiment
or simulation. The reason for this being the constraints on
QBER (≈ 4.8%) and key symmetry (≈ 50%), which were
fixed in course of the optimization strategy A to infer the
estimated key rate, as discussed earlier in Section IV C. There-
fore, all the fluctuations in the measured data get reflected
on the estimated key rate figures. However, in Table V, we
observe that both the key rate and key symmetry (or asym-
metry in the key) have one order of magnitude higher error
values than QBER, as in optimization strategy B asymmetry
was also considered an unconstrained parameter for optim-
ization along with key rate. It is important to note that such
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choice of optimization results involves different implications
on the security of the resultant secure key as discussed earlier
in Section IV C.
Secondly, for both tables, our in-lab free-space experi-
mental demonstration of the B92 protocol (discussed in
Section IV B) was conducted during day and night time. For
both time periods, the similarity of the experimental results
reflects that the in-lab conditions varied indistinctly at dif-
ferent times of the day. In principle, the estimated key rate
should be same for both the day and the night time meas-
urements; however, we hypothesize that the thermostatic
regulations and other stray light shielding facilities, having
realistic imperfections, introduce the increase in key rate es-
timates for the night time measurements. As the background
noise level forms a key input to the simulation toolkit, the
negligible variation of the in-lab conditions at different times
of the day gets reflected in the simulation results as well.
Thirdly, again for both tables in general, we note that
though having a longer crystal length should potentially
lead to a higher key rate due to increased pair production
rate, the 30 mm crystal length produces a lower key rate
estimate than the 20 mm one for the experimental results
unlike the simulation part, where the logic is rather consist-
ent. This is because in the experimentally measured data
sets, the 30 mm crystal besides having higher signal level
also posses an increased noise level due to the detection of
more background photons, which then lowers the key rate
to ensure that the QBER optimization remains within the
threshold value of 4.8%. However, by the same logic, the
simulation should also have a lower key rate than that for
the 20 mm crystal length, since the same background rate
forms an input to the simulation. Nevertheless, we observe
a contradiction there. As per our understanding, the origin
of this discrepancy is due to the assumptions involved with
the pair generation rate calculation while simulating the
type-II collinear degenerate SPDC process. The simulated
pair generation rate is directly proportional to the crystal
length as well as the input pump intensity at the crystal
which wasn’t observed experimentally. Through separate
experimental tests we have verified that the singles and the
coincidence rates observed at the detectors does not increase
linearly with increase in the pump beam intensity and the
crystal length. From these test results, it can be inferred
that the pair generation rate at the crystal does not increase
linearly as well. Thus the pair generation rate obtained from
the simulation differs from the actual value obtained from
the experiment, resulting in discrepancy between the final
results for the 30mm crystal length. Additionally, in the
case of the experimentally estimated key rate with the 30
mm crystal, the error values are also higher owing to the
increased fluctuations in the measured data points on the
coincidence plot. In a nutshell, due to these reasons, the
results from the experiment and those from the simulation
offer a better match when the length of the crystal is 20
mm compared to the 30 mm case that involves both higher
background noise and more fluctuations.
Lastly, it is important to point out that while the optimiza-
tion strategies focus on fixed values of QBER and asymmetry
in the key-string, the estimated key rate is itself associated
with a standard deviation in case of both the experiment
and simulation. While the sources of this deviation for the
experiment are imperfections of the source, devices, com-
ponents etc., that for the simulation are primarily captured
by the methodology of the simulation which is based on
random number generation from both uniform and normal
distributions. While certain aspects of the experiment such
as loss through the medium, generation of time stamps and
detection efficiency are simulated using random number gen-
eration from a uniform distribution; the alignment errors,
timing jitter, etc. have been simulated using random num-
bers from a normal distribution. This, explained in detail in
Sections VI and VII, results in deviation in the outcomes for
multiple simulation runs of the protocol which have been
shown in the tables.
IX. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
In this manuscript, we discuss in detail our in-house
developed simulator qkdSim, which has been created to
specifically provide the QKD community with a simulation
toolkit that takes into account practical imperfections as may
be encountered in an actual experiment. Earlier available
softwares including qkdX do not contain much discussion on
attendant physical processes and/or physical components.
Our qkdSim aims to bring in more practical considerations
to QKD simulations so that realistic predictions about the
key rate and the QBER can be made before investment
of resources in developing the physical QKD system. To
this end, in our current work, we have shown how qkdSim
simulates the B92 protocol in detail. We have discussed
simulations of various physical components as well as
physical processes following the Agifall software model. A
representative key rate from the experiment is 51 ± 0.5
Kbits/sec whereas that from the qkdSim simulated value is
52.83± 0.36 Kbits/sec, corresponding to a representative
QBER of 4.79% ± 0.01% from both. Having successfully
simulated the B92 protocol, which is an example of a QKD
protocol that does not use entanglement as the basis for
security, we will, in future work address the applicability of
qkdSim to entanglement based QKD. This will bring us a
step closer to the desired all-purpose QKD software, which
is capable of simulating arbitrary QKD protocols, giving due
importance to experimental imperfections and conditions.
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APPENDIX A: BOOTSTRAPPING ON MEASUREMENT OUTCOMES
Motivation
To estimate an optimal choice for the data acquisition rate (measurement time for each data set versus number of data sets
measured) for an appropriate estimation of key rate, QBER and asymmetry (or key symmetry) obtained in our experimental
demonstration of the B92 protocol.
Methodology
For a given measurement run of TOTDATASETS sets, each of time TOTTIME picoseconds:
1. We choose the start and end time window marker positions for both the coincidence plots i.e. between Alice & Bob V
basis (vertical) and Alice & Bob + basis (diagonal). This provides us with three lists of time stamps sorted in ascending
order corresponding to each measurement set.
2. We choose an uniform random sequence of length TOTDATASETS.
3. Using a fast binary search algorithm we collect k (<TOTTIME) seconds of data from each of the above three lists,
starting from the time stamp entry found in the random sequence SEQUENCE. For those three output lists we calculate
the Keyrate.
4. We repeat step-3 for each element of SEQUENCE and then obtain the average Keyrate over those elements.
5. To remove any bias, we randomize (or repeat) steps 2-4 over many iterations. We store the average Keyrate, QBER
and Asymmetry obtained in each iteration.
6. We finally calculate the ratio: standard deviation (SD) over mean (M) of all the average Keyrates.
7. We repeat steps 2-6 for a range of k values and finally obtain a plot over that range.
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Result
We tested our bootstrap method over a measurement run where (TOTDATASETS=) 20 sets of (TOTTIME=) 15 × 1012
picoseconds data were collected. In order to remove bias, for each set and corresponding to every chosen size of time
window, the estimated values of key rate, QBER & key symmetry were averaged over 10000 iterations. The result obtained
is presented in Figure 26.
Figure 26: Bootstrap analysis (SD/Mean of key rate) plot on a 15 seconds data-set from a series of 20 measurement runs.
Here each run consists of 10000 iterations. The saturation or convergence effect is supported by the exponential fit to
the simulated data-points. The goodness of the fit is gauranteed by the low values for sum-of-squares error (SSE) and
root-mean-square error (RMSE) as well as close to 1 values for R-squared (R-sq.) and adjusted R-squared (Adj. R-sq.).
As expected, from this result, we observe that the ratio of SD by Mean decreases with increase in the data collection time of
k seconds for each measurement and finally saturates beyond a certain value (here say, ≈ 9 seconds) of k as it approaches
TOTTIME. To have an appropriate estimate of the key rate, QBER and key symmetry, the measurement runtime (which for
our experiment was fixed to 20 sets of 10 seconds each) should belong to this saturation region.
APPENDIX B: OPTIMIZATION METHODS FOR DATA ANALYSIS
Overview
In classical cryptography, asymmetry quantifies the disparity between the number of ‘0’ bits and ‘1’ bits in the key shared
by Alice and Bob. For perfect secrecy of the key string, the probability of a certain key bit to be ‘0’ or ‘1’ should be equal for
all the bits in the key string. Thus, we can consider that asymmetry in key string can give rise to security issues in QKD
protocols. In the implementation of a QKD protocol, the sifted key generated can be asymmetric since the various optical
components induce some imperfections.
To account for this asymmetry in key string due to device imperfection, we define two types of optimization strategies,
namely A & B, to obtain the optimal values for the key rate, QBER and key symmetry. Both strategies have their advantages
and short-comings. In strategy A, we maximize the key rate while keeping the QBER below a certain threshold and
maintaining approximately 50:50 key symmetry. Here, the asymmetry obtained in the key string is negligible, however
the fixing of asymmetry value introduces the possibility for leakage of additional information to the eavesdropper. On the
other hand in strategy B, we maximize the key rate with similar constraints on QBER but not on key symmetry. With this
technique, the key rate gets increased; however now the security gets compromised to some extent since the probability for
obtaining any key string out of 2N options, where N is no. of key bits in each key string, remains no longer 12 .
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Methodology
In our experimental version of the B92 protocol, we measure two coincidence curves which includes coincidences
between: Alice & Bob’s V basis and Alice & Bob’s + basis, as sketched in Figure 7.
Strategy A: We use the this method to maximize the output key rate while maintaining an asymmetry (also referred to
as key symmetry) value of t 50% and simultaneously ensuring a quantum-bit-error-rate (QBER) ≤ 4.8% in our protocol.
For a given dataset in a measurement run S of datasets, the main steps of this strategy are listed as follows:
1. Detect and mark the coincidence maximum points in both plots.
2. In the first plot, consider an almost wide window, i.e. place the window markers on the left (or WINLEFTCURVE1)
and the right (or WINRIGHTCURVE1) of the coincidence maximum. Ensure that they are located far beyond the
full-width-at-half-maxima (FWHM) points.
3. Move both the window markers with equal step size towards the coincidence maximum and in turn maximize the key
rate (i.e. whole area under the curve) within the considered window span. Ensure that the QBER remains below the
threshold value of 4.8% during maximization.
4. Retain the optimized window position in the left concidence plot and in a similar way optimize the left (or WINLEFT-
CURVE2) and the right (or WINRIGHTCURVE2) window marker positions on the right coincidence plot. During this
optimization, ensure that t 50% symmetry exists between the key rates obtained from both the curves and also that
the overall QBER from both curves lies within 4.8%.
Lastly, store the optimized key rates, QBERs and key symmetry (or asymmetry) values for all the S datasets in three
different lists: say OPTKEY, OPTQBER and OPTASYMMETRY respectively. Calculate the mean value for each of the three lists to
obtain the optimal key rate, QBER and key symmetry for the entire measurement run over S datasets.
Strategy B: We use the this method to maximize the output key rate while only ensuring a quantum-bit-error-rate (QBER)
≤ 4.8% in our protocol. For a given dataset in a measurement run S of datasets, the main steps of this strategy are listed as
follows:
1. Detect and mark the coincidence maximum points in both plots.
2. In the first plot, consider an almost wide window, i.e. place the window markers on the left (or WINLEFTCURVE1)
and the right (or WINRIGHTCURVE1) of the coincidence maximum. Ensure that they are located far beyond the
full-width-at-half-maxima (FWHM) points.
3. Move both the window markers with equal step size towards the coincidence maximum and in turn maximize the
signal to noise ratio (SNR), i.e. the ratio of the areas under the curve: above and below the upper bound background
noise level, within the considered window span.
4. Retain the optimized window position in the left concidence plot and in a similar way optimize the left (or WINLEFT-
CURVE2) and the right (or WINRIGHTCURVE2) window marker positions on the right coincidence plot.
5. After SNR optimization on the second coincidence plot, move both its window markers in or out to achieve the current
window span on the first coincidence plot.
6. Alter the window size by moving the slightly markers in/out to ensure that the overall QBER doesn’t cross the threshold
value of 4.8%.
In the similar approach as used in strategy A, obtain the mean value from each of the three optimized lists for key rates,
QBERs and asymmetry values to report the optimal key rate, QBER and key symmetry for the entire measurement run.
APPENDIX C: SINGLE PHOTON TIME-STAMPING
Given the time stamping data for single photons emitted from an ideal single photon source, we plot the distribution
for pair-wise time interval, where the X-axis is the time difference between any two consecutive photons (tn+1 − tn), and
Y-axis represents the number of such events per second. This distribution possesses an anti-bunching property at smaller
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Figure 27: Simulation: at high resolution (i.e. narrow bin width of 1 ps), we observe the anti-bunching behaviour of a single photon distribution. The
exponential decay-rate being low is invisible at very short (highly resolved) time periods. More particularly, at zero time difference no events occurred
since the multi-photon probability was considered to be zero. Here, the standard deviation (σ) was arbitrarily taken to be 10 ps and so the curve owing to
the number of events saturates after 3σ of pair-wise time difference.
Figure 28: Simulation: at low resolution (i.e. broader bin width of 1 ns), we observe the exponential decay nature which is expected from any random
distribution. Here, the abbreviations RMSE, SSE and R-sq. stand for root mean square error, sum of square error, and R-squared respectively. They
determine the relative and absolute goodness of the fit.
time scales (∆t → 0) (see Figure 27) and an exponential decay nature at larger time scales (far from zero time interval,
∆t >> 0) as depicted in Figure 28.
This behaviour (exponential decay) was also noticed in our experimental data as shown in Fig 29. We cannot observe the
anti-bunching behaviour at shorter time scale as the deadtime (45 ns) of our detector is much larger than the coherence
time.
Figure 29: Measurement: considering a binsize of 13 ps we observe the exponential decay nature for the distribution of frequency of single photon
events versus pair-wise time interval between two consecutive photons emitted from the SPDC source along the signal (or idler) path. The measurements
were collected for time window of 2 seconds and a pump power of 2 mW was used. The R-squared (R-sq.) value of the exponential fit in pink is ≈ 1
ensuring a nice fit to the measured data-points.
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APPENDIX D: PHASE MATCHING TEMPERATURE FOR OUR PPKTP CRYSTAL
Considering the law of momentum conservation (stated in Figure 22) for a SPDC process (described in Figure 21), the
phase matching condition for a periodically poled crystal:
Kp cosθp = Ks cosθs + Ki cosθi +
2pi
Λ (T )
Ks sinθs = Ki sinθi (2)
where Λ (T ) is the poling period of the crystal dependent on temperature T and θ is the angle with respect to the direction of
pump propagation. Further considering the conditions of colinearity (i. e. θs = θi = 0) and degeneracy
 
i. e.ωs =ωi =
ωp
2

,
also K = 2pinλ . Thus substituting these conditions in Eq. 2 we get,
2pinp
λp
=
2pins
λs
+
2pini
λi
+
2pi
Λ (T )
(3)
where, np, ns and ni are the nonlinear refractive indices for the pump, signal and idler photons. Also, λp, λs and λi
represent the wavelengths of the pump, signal and idler photons respectively.
Now, each of these nh = f (T, sˆ, λh) where hε {p, s, i}; with T being temperature, sˆ being polarization direction and λh
being its wavelength. So, a thermal expansion of the poling period gives [85],
Λ (T ) = Λ0

1+α (T − T0) + β (T − T0)2
	
(4)
where T0 = 25◦C room temperature, also for KTP crystal α = (6.7± 0.7) × 10−6

deg C−1

and β = (11± 2) ×
10−9

deg C−1

. Also, a thermal expansion of refractive indices provides [85, 86],
n (λ, T ) = n (λ, T = T0) +
∂ n
∂ T

(λ, T=T0)
(T − T0)
+
∂ 2n
∂ T 2

(λ, T=T0)
(T − T0)2 . (5)
Say, n1 (λ) =
∂ n
∂ T

(λ, T=T0)
and n2 (λ) =
∂ 2n
∂ T 2

(λ, T=T0)
.
Now, Sellmeier equations for PPKTP crystals are [82–84]:
one pole: n2 (λ, T = T0) = A+
B
1− Cλ−2 − Dλ
2;& (6)
two pole: n2z (λ, T = T0) = A+
B
1− Cλ−2 (7)
− D
1− Eλ−2 − Fλ
2.
